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Abstract:  Public choice economists began studying the economics of anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount 
of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important public choice contributions to the 
economics of anarchy. Following the lead of the early public choice economists, many current economists are 
researching and analyzing how individuals interact without government. From their non-public-interested 
explanations of the creation of government law enforcement to their historical studies of attempts to internalize 
externalities under anarchy, public choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective on government and 
how people interact when government law enforcement is lacking. Although the economics of politics often receives 
more attention, the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in public choice.   
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  1 
“It is high time to shift out of the pragmatic mind-set that has been our national characteristic. The grand 
alternatives for social organization must be reconsidered. The loss of faith in the socialist dream has not, 
and probably will not, restore faith in laissez-faire. But what are the effective alternatives? Does 
anarchism deserve a hearing, and, if so, what sort of anarchism?”         James 




Most economists take a system of government and law enforcement as given in their work. In many 
situations in the real world, however, government enforcement is imperfect, weak, corrupt, or absent, 
leaving people in an effective state of anarchy. What then? Are people still able to make economic 
choices, and can economists study the situation? In the early 1970s economists at the Center for the Study 
of Public Choice asked novel questions and pioneered the study of anarchy using public choice 
economics. James Buchanan (2005, p.267) describes how the public choice economists “saw challenge in 
analyzing just what genuine anarchy would look like.” Buchanan recalls how his colleague, Winston 
Bush, got them interested in studying a stateless society: “Before we knew it, we were all working on 
anarchy, and he had organized the most exciting continuing seminar in which I have been associated, 
before or since” (2005, p.267). 
The public choice analysis of anarchy is an important but often overlooked strand of research in 
the economics of non-market decision making. “The economic analysis of anarchy attracted much effort 
in the early 1970s” (Buchanan, 2003, p.6), and it has spawned much more research since. Public choice 
analysis of anarchy began with two edited volumes published by the Center for the Study of Public 
Choice, Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy (1972) and Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy 
(1974a), and works that followed by Gordon Tullock (The Social Dilemma, 1974b) and James Buchanan 
(The Limits of Liberty, 1975). At the same time David Friedman (1973), Murray Rothbard (1973), and 
Robert Nozick (1974) began discussing anarchy as well.  
The early public choice scholars sought to explore the theory of anarchism and what an 
anarchistic equilibrium would look like.  Since their initial contributions, the quantity of work in the 
economics of anarchy has burgeoned. For example, recent public choice scholars have conducted 
historical investigations into whether governments created a monopoly over law to respond to a market 
failure (to advance the public interest) or due to more self-interested motivations. Other scholars have 
studied how parties interact without government, often finding that parties devise private mechanisms to 
produce order.  Today the discussion of and research on anarchy continues with economists using modern 
theory and experimental laboratories to explore the equilibrium or equilibria that might arise under 
anarchy. 
  2In this article we highlight the major public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. 
Section 2 summarizes the early contributions to the theory of anarchy made in the 1970s.  Section 3 
examines how modern public choice economists have applied rent seeking stories to the emergence of 
government law enforcement.  Section 4 summarizes the literature on historical studies of anarchy and the 
methods through which parties create what might be considered ordered anarchy.  Section 5 summarizes 
the more recent theoretical debates surrounding the economics of anarchy.  Section 6 concludes.   
 
 
2.  Early public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy 
 
In an indication of their originality, the original public choice economists asked big questions about 
political economy rather than restricting themselves to the boundaries of traditional economics. They 
sought to explore and model ways that people in a state of anarchy might interact. James Buchanan 
describes the questions that the public choice economists asked: 
What were the descriptive features of Hobbesian anarchy? Could something like an 
anarchistic equilibrium be defined? Bush was instrumental in organizing a series of 
weekly workshops in 1972 during which each participant in turn presented papers on 
differing aspects of the theory of anarchy. As revised, these papers were published in 
Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy. (Buchanan, 1992:116) 
 
In 1972 and 1974, the Center for the Study of Public Choice published two edited volumes, Explorations 
in the Theory of Anarchy and Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy. The volumes contained 
contributions by many original public choice thinkers, including James Buchanan, Winston Bush, 
Thomas Hogarty, J. Patrick Gunning, Laurence Moss, Warren Samuels, William Craig Stubblebine, and 
Gordon Tullock, who also edited the volumes.  
  James Buchanan speaks highly of this endeavor in his public lectures and his autobiography. He 
recalls the importance of the project: 
Those weeks were exciting because never before or since have I participated so fully in a 
genuinely multiparty ongoing research effort, one that we knew to be relevant in some 
ultimate sense...For me this brief period of research activity was important because it 
gave me a new focus on my whole enterprise. (1992:116) 
 
Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy and Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy clearly 
influenced subsequent scholarship in public choice, including Buchanan’s Limits of Liberty (dedicated to 
  3Winston Bush) and Tullock’s The Social Dilemma, as well as modern research in public choice today. We 
begin by summarizing these early contributions.  
  Winston Bush (1972) wrote the pioneering article, “Individual Welfare In Anarchy.” His work, an 
extension of which was published in the Journal of Economic Theory (Bush and Mayer, 1974), provides a 
mathematical model of social interaction without the state.
1 Although Bush (1972: 5) wrote, “Anarchy as 
an organizing principle for society must appeal to anyone who places individual freedom high on his scale 
of values,” he was not sure how stable it (or, for that matter, any system including constitutional 
government) could be over the long run. When people interact, they can choose to respect the other’s 
property or to engage in predation. Bush argues that in a state of anarchy, individuals expend too many 
resources on predation, making both parties worse off. After the distribution of property rights under 
Hobbesian anarchy is established, agreeing on a common set of rules will be mutually beneficial. 
Although he is inclined to favor a society without rules, Bush believes that predation would prevail. As an 
example, when Robinson Crusoe and Friday first meet, they know little of each other, might never 
interact again, and have no ability to rely on external enforcement, so we might expect the results of the 
standard prisoners’ dilemma to hold. 
Other members of the Center for the Study of Public Choice came to similar conclusions as did 
Bush. Tullock’s (1972, p.65-75) “The Edge of the Jungle” advances the Bush hypothesis, arguing that 
cooperation would be limited under anarchy. Without government enforcement, long term contracting and 
many other beneficial trades would not occur. People would spend too many resources engaging in 
opportunistic behavior, which would eventually lead to anarchy’s demise. Tullock maintains that those 
with a comparative advantage in the use of force will overpower the weak and impose government. 
Although government could be used to redistribute resources, Tullock argues that creating this external 
enforcer could benefit all members of society.  The government apparatus still uses power to enforce the 
law, but it eliminates the use of force by others. The ensuing reduction of conflict creates incentives for 
production rather than predation.  
  Tullock elaborates on many of these questions in his 1974 book, The Social Dilemma: The 
Economics of War and Revolution. The prisoners’ dilemma occupies a central place in the analysis. 
Tullock gives reasons why people form government, but he recognizes that conflict may always persist. 
He analyzes revolution and how parties attempt to use violence to overtake the government. Tullock also 
describes how states can become dictatorships and how different states can come into conflict. Although 
                                                 
1 Whereas Bush (1972) models a society with two individuals, Bush and Mayer (1974) model a society with 
multiple individuals in their attempt to see if an anarchist equilibrium could be defined. Okuguchi (1976) extends 
the model further to explore the stability of an equilibrium in an anarchist society.  
  4Tullock presents the state as a force ultimately for good, he recognizes that in certain ways the Hobbesian 
dilemma is never solved. 
Like Tullock, Thomas Hogarty (1972) believes that life in anarchy is brutish. Taking a somewhat 
more empirical approach, Hogarty argues against anarchy using three case studies. As his first example, 
Hogarty points out that brown rats do not have government, and, in fact, often bite each other. In his 
second example, Hogarty discusses how the children in Lord of the Flies, who lacked government, 
engaged in many malicious acts. As his final example, Hogarty argues that a prisoner of war camp during 
the American Civil War provides an example of individual interaction without a state. Rather than acting 
cooperatively, the prisoners engaged in aggressive behavior. All three case studies lack cooperation, so 
Hogarty concludes that an anarchist equilibrium is undesirable. 
Gunning’s (1972) chapter does not rule out ordered anarchy, but he believes that anarchy can 
only function at a primitive level. He believes that more advanced relations involving trade require 
external enforcement. In Gunning’s words, “Even if trades are expected to be infinitely-recurring, there 
may be no trade.” He gives an example of a pygmy and a giant who would be unable to make contracts 
unless a third party, a super-giant, entered the picture. The super-giant is an analogy for the government 
that prevents cheating. In this view, government is potentially beneficial to all because it enables people 
to engage in contracts. 
Engaging in contracts without government is only one issue; enforcing property rights without 
government is another. Buchanan (1972) analyzes the situation of Hobbesian anarchy as a prisoners’ 
dilemma.  Buchanan believes that people will act opportunistically when given the incentive; although 
they would be better off following common rules, they have no way to commit. Buchanan uses this to 
derive a contract theory of the state. By implementing an external enforcer, the prisoners’ dilemma can be 
solved.  
  Two years later, the follow up to Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, the 70 page volume 
Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, was published (Tullock, 1974). The second volume came 
out of the same series of workshops at the Center for the Study of Public Choice, and contained another 
article by Tullock and three articles by scholars outside of the center: Laurence Moss, Warren Samuels, 
and David Pingry. Moss (1974) takes the possibility of ordered anarchy most seriously. Moss writes that 
although economists have further developed the economic theory of anarchism in recent years, the idea 
that markets can function without government was popular in eighteenth century America as well. He 
argues that (non-economist) anarchists such as Josiah Warren, Lysander Spooner, and Benjamin Tucker 
  5were simply defending the ideals of the Declaration of Independence. Moss then discusses how Murray 
Rothbard and other modern free-market economists have picked up this tradition.
2  
Samuels (1974) is critical of anarchism and of Rothbard’s conception in particular. Samuels 
believes that power relations will be present under private property anarchism or any form of markets. He 
sympathizes with the anarchist goals of freedom, order, and markets, and shares a suspicion of the state, 
but he questions whether anarchism will deliver those ends Samuels maintains that agencies enforcing 
libertarian law would be nominally private but equivalent to government. He criticizes Rothbard (1973) 
for simply wanting to replace one type of coercion with another. To Samuels, the theory of anarchism 
fails to resolve the problem of power relations and so should not be considered superior to government.
3  
Buchanan elaborated on many of these questions at great length in his 1975 book Limits of 
Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. He seeks to explore the institutional arrangements that people 
would choose to create a social order. Here Buchanan clearly shows his fascination with anarchy as an 
ideal:  
To the individualist, the ideal or utopian world is necessarily anarchistic in some basic 
philosophical sense. This world is peopled exclusively by persons who respect the 
minimal set of behavioral norms dictated by mutual tolerance and respect. Individuals 
remain free to ‘do their own things’ within such limits, and cooperative ventures are 
exclusively voluntary. Persons retain the freedom to opt out of any sharing arrangements 
which they might join. No man holds coercive power over any other man, and there is no 
impersonal bureaucracy, military or civil, that imposes external constraint. The state does 
indeed wither away in this utopia (1975, p.3).  
Although Buchanan refers to himself as a “philosophical anarchist,”
  he argues that contemporary 
anarchists (Friedman, 1973; Rothbard, 1973) have not addressed how the initial distribution of property 
rights occurs in a stateless society (Buchanan, 1974, p.915; 1975, p.181). Ultimately Buchanan believes 
that a stateless order would be conflict prone and that to solve the prisoners’ dilemmas that arise under 
anarchy, people would contract to create a state.  
                                                 
2 In his 1980 article in Public Choice, “Optimal Jurisdictions and the Economic Theory of the State: Or, Anarchy 
and One-World Government Are Only Corner Solutions,” Moss compares the theories of the state developed by 
Nozick and Buchanan.  
3 Together the Moss and Samuels chapters occupy the first 59 pages of Further Explorations in the Theory of 
Anarchy; the Pingry and Tullock chapters occupy the last 11. Pingry (1974) argues that externalities exist under 
anarchy, so people will have incentives to create a constrained anarchy with property rights. Tullock (1974b, pp.65-
70) explains how the existence of externalities and transaction costs justifies government. Nevertheless, Tullock 
maintains that government may never eliminate externalities, as those in charge will always be tempted to be 
corrupt. 
  6Outside the Center for the Study of Public Choice, Friedman (1973), Rothbard (1973), and 
Nozick (1974) also made significant contributions to the economic analysis of anarchy. Although how 
much all these scholars interacted is unclear, most seem to be aware of the work of others, as indicated by 
their citations. In For a New Liberty Rothbard takes a more explicitly normative approach.
4 He starts with 
a theoretical discussion of how a market could provide law enforcement and courts, and then argues that 
the only way to determine the amount of protection necessary is to have a market for law enforcement. 
Next he provides a speculative account of how multiple competing firms could provide police and courts 
and offers some ways that people who subscribe to different protection agencies could settle disputes. 
Under Rothbard’s vision, protection agencies would hold each other mutually accountable to respect 
individual rights.  
David Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom (1973) also hypothesizes how a market could 
provide law and order.  Friedman argues that one need not be ideological; rather, one can embrace 
anarchism out of pure self-interest. Where Rothbard argues for anarchism based on rights, Friedman 
argues for anarchism based on efficiency. Friedman’s vision differs from that of Rothbard because 
Friedman believes that anarchist laws need not be libertarian. Under a market for law, people would be 
free to choose any rules they wish, and net willingness to pay would determine the resulting outcome. 
Friedman describes how multiple police forces might operate in each area and their incentives to settle 
disputes through bargaining rather than violence. 
Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) speculates on what would happen in an 
anarchic world where multiple groups could enforce the law. He argues that out of a system of multiple 
competing firms eventually a dominant agency will establish itself. He maintains that this dominant firm 
could legitimately protect its clients from other potentially risky firms. He says outlawing competing 
agencies would not violate anyone’s rights as long as the dominant firm compensated them with 
protection.  Nozick argues that eventually, through an invisible hand process, the dominant firm will 
become a monopoly and establish a minimal state. To Nozick, anarchy is not a stable outcome.   
Like Nozick, the Center for the Study of Public Choice economists’ overall perspective on 
anarchism could be described as sympathetic, but ultimately pessimistic. Much of the discussion about 
whether anarchy would be chaotic or ordered would resurface in modern debates three decades later. How 
much order versus how much conflict occurs under anarchy is an empirical question. Through Limits of 
Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, The Social Dilemma, Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, 
and Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, the public choice economists helped open the door 
for subsequent scholars to explore anarchy from an economic point of view. 
                                                 
4 For a literature review of the normative works on anarchism published in the 1970s, see Stringham (2007). For a 
review appearing in Public Choice, see Leeson  (2007c). 
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3.  Applying public choice to government law: Extending the public choice arguments 
 
Since the 1970s, many public choice scholars have extended the work of the original public choice 
economists. Whereas many of the original contributors argued that government law enforcement is 
created to serve the public interest (in the contract theory of the state), subsequent research by public 
choice scholars has questioned that assumption. Public choice scholars including Bruce Benson, Robert 
Ekelund, and Anthony de Jasay have provided both theory and evidence regarding why government law 
enforcement is created for special interests rather than to benefit the public. These scholars apply public 
choice logic even more persistently than the early public choice economists did, and thus are more 
skeptical that governments improve on stateless situations.   
De Jasay’s (1985) book The State maintains that the State acts in its own interest first and 
foremost. He says that society cannot expect to leave anarchy under the assumption that all will be well 
with government. In a review in Public Choice, James Buchanan (1986, p.242) summarizes de Jasay’s 
perspective, “Once the state’s own interest (or the interests of those who act as agents) is so much 
recognized, the Hobbesian post-contract dilemma arises. How can the state, acknowledged to have its 
own interests, and empowered with the authority to act, be prevented from acting as its interests dictate?” 
In de Jasay’s point of view, the State and its law enforcement apparatus are adversaries of the public. His 
other books, including Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem (1990), also 
advance this hypothesis. De Jasay argues that the creation of government actually causes free-riding and 
interferes with peoples’ ability to create order.
5  
In Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order, de Jasay (1997) further advances the 
idea that order exists independent of government. First De Jasay criticizes the advocates of limited 
government who argue that the state has the ability to eliminate suboptimal outcomes. Just because a 
problem exists does not mean that government has the ability to solve it. He then argues that under 
anarchy individuals have an incentive to internalize some of the negative externalities that result from 
conflict. The key is to find market solutions to potential problems. De Jasay addresses the claim that 
people need government if they want to interact outside of small groups. He says that although any given 
transaction may appear to be a prisoners’ dilemma, transactions take place in the complex web of society, 
where repeated transactions and reputation effects create incentives for cooperation. Rather than viewing 
government as positive, de Jasay argues that it crowds out order that exists independent of government. 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that, although he does not view the state as negatively as does de Jasay, Tullock discusses 
essentially this problem in his (1971) article “Public Decisions as Public Goods.”  While the economic justification 
for a government is to solve public good problems, good government itself is a public good. 
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Buchanan (1986, p.241-243) calls de Jasay’s analysis “flint-hard” and recognizes that de Jasay severely 
challenges the contractarian-constitutionalist conception of the state. 
Another public choice scholar who does not rule out anarchy is Mueller (1988). Mueller argues 
that under certain conditions anarchy can effectively produce the public goods necessary for an orderly 
society. When a society has a small population, repeated dealings enable people to solve prisoners’ 
dilemmas and effectively produce public goods. Mueller also argues that government is not created to 
provide order, because order precedes government. Mueller (1988, p.822) writes, “Formal laws and their 
impartial enforcement by government authority would not be relied upon to maintain order within a 
village, but to transfer resources out of it. Formal laws and their enforcement in medieval society are 
more typically to raise revenue for the king or local knight.” Mueller believes that anarchy cannot 
function in a modern society, but he questions the old account that ordered anarchy is a priori impossible 
and that the state is created to bring order. 
Benson is another public choice scholar who maintains that government law enforcement is 
created to benefit the government and ends up crowding out private order. In his 1990 book Enterprise of 
Law and his 1994 article “Are Public Goods Really Common Pools? Considerations of Policing and 
Highways in England,” Benson presents an historical account of how government law enforcement in 
England actually came about. Benson documents how private parties in medieval England solved disputes 
without relying on government courts. The system was largely restitution based, so wrongdoers had to 
compensate their victims. Even though law enforcement requires coordination between many people, 
Benson describes how people joined groups of one hundred to police and settle disputes. The Anglo-
Saxon kings, however, began centralizing the law once they realized that they could use the legal system 
to collect revenue. By declaring private torts also to be violations of the king’s peace, they could require 
wrongdoers to pay fines to the king in addition to restitution to the actual victim. By the time of the 
Norman invasion, the king declared that all restitution must go directly to him. Predictably, this 
eliminated the incentive for private law enforcement and created the “need” for public law enforcement. 
The article shows that government law enforcement was created, not to deal with market failure, but to 
enhance revenue for the state. 
Ekelund and Dorton (2003) present a similar account in their article, “Criminal Justice 
Institutions as a Common Pool: The 19
th Century Analysis of Edwin Chadwick.” Ekelund and Dorton 
outline the arguments by Chadwick, an economist who analyzed of the evolution of government law 
enforcement in England. Chadwick starts by discussing how one thousand years ago, disputes were 
settled privately in what was called the frankpledge system; he believed the system worked well (Ekelund 
and Dorton, 2003, pp.275-6). Over time, however, government involvement increased, thereby 
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because government had created so many common pool problems. Ekelund and Dorton (2003, p.281) 
write, “The deficiencies of the common pool criminal justice system are no more apparent then in the 
kind of criminal procedure followed in Chadwick’s day and, to a large degree, in our own. They are, 
furthermore, then and now, riddled with rent seeking behavior within the court system.” Rather than 
viewing government law enforcers as a public spirited group, Ekelund and Dorton (2003, p.290) write, 
“The incentives of police did not serve the end of crime prevention or even of reasonable enforcement of 
laws.”  
The perspective of De Jasay, Benson, Ekelund, and Dorton is that governments do not take over 
law enforcement to fix some market failure. Rather, order precedes government. The most comprehensive 
studies of private examples of law and order are Benson’s (1990) The Enterprise of Law and Benson’s 
(1998) To Serve and Protect. From privately developed law in the Middle Ages to examples of private 
policing in modern society, many examples exist of law and order independent of the State. The State 
comes in and displaces the private system not to fix a market failure; rather, it comes in to advance its 
own interests. Benson calls his analysis of the legal history “a public choice approach to authoritarian 
law.” Compared to the early public choice scholars’ research on anarchy, the public choice economics of 
Benson, Ekelund, Dorton, and De Jasay could be considered more public choice than public choice. 
 
 
4.  Case studies of anarchy: Ordered anarchy and the internalization of relevant externalities 
 
Once one recognizes that government may not be perfect or created to eliminate market failures, it opens 
up a number of questions. Is having a state necessarily an improvement over what came before?  Will all 
anarchic situations be Hobbesian, or might ordered anarchy be possible under certain circumstances? 
What conditions would be required for ordered anarchy to be attained, and under what conditions could 
ordered anarchy be extended? To answer these questions one needs to study what society looked liked 
before government and how parties interact when they are outside the influence of government.  
This section provides an overview of studies that document human interaction in an effective 
state of anarchy. Whereas early scholars viewed anarchy as a Hobbesian war of all against all, many 
recent scholars have documented many examples of how parties have benefited from creating order 
independent of government. We start by discussing studies of relatively simple interactions within 
relatively small, homogenous groups, and then proceed to discuss studies of interaction in more 
complicated situations. Although most non-economists assume that all trade would be impossible without 
government, many economists recognize that trade is possible without external enforcement if it’s within 
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dealings (1766/1982, p.538), many economists have recognized that repeated interaction creates 
incentives for parties to cooperate rather than cheat (Tullock 1985, 1999). As Telser (1980) explains, 
these contracts can be self-enforcing. Evidence also indicates that people may cooperate due to 
internalized notions of reciprocity (McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith, 1996). Nevertheless, cooperative 
behavior may not be dominant in all circumstances (Barzell, 2002). Cooperation is often difficult if 
groups have high discount rates, are too large, or are too heterogeneous (Ostrom, 1991, p.166).   
Despite what standard game theory might predict, economists have started documenting that trade 
is possible without external enforcement, even in more complex situations when trade involves long 
distances, large groups, heterogeneous traders, and/or complicated transactions that take place over time. 
Parties profit by finding mechanisms to make sure their bargains are upheld. Similarly, whereas most 
non-economists assume that all property rights and legal rules must come from the state, economists are 
documenting how private parties have built in incentives to make property rights secure and eliminate 
conflict. As Vernon Smith (1996, p.3) writes, “property rights predate nation states.” By voluntarily 
adhering to customary law, as opposed to coercively imposed law, parties are able to make themselves 
better off. In this section we discuss the ways in which parties attempt to and often successfully create 
ordered anarchy. 
 
4.a. Complex trade without government 
Trade in religiously homogenous groups 
In the diamond industry traders deal with merchandise worth thousands of dollars, yet they are 
able to enforce contracts without government courts. Bernstein (1992) shows how the New York diamond 
industry has solved the problem of contract enforcement by organizing trade in a small and religiously 
homogenous group. The New York Diamond Dealers Club has traditionally been composed of members 
of the orthodox Jewish community.  Disputes between members are submitted to the club’s arbitration 
system, which has many advantages over government courts, including speed of resolution, privacy, and 
judges who are industry insiders and can rely on custom rather than overly formal rules. Reputation and 
social sanctions enforce arbitration decisions without coercion. Social sanctions take place in Jewish 
religious and civic activities, plus dealers must have a reputation for abiding by the arbitration network’s 
decisions if they want to conduct business.  A party that does not abide by these decisions will be 
ostracized and may even be kicked out of the trading community. Thus, a trader’s reputation serves as a 
bond that will be forfeited if one is not reliable.  Because everyone is a member of a tightly knit group, 
the potential problem of fraud among diamond traders is solved.   
  11  Other studies have documented how organizing within religiously homogenous groups enables 
self-enforcing contracts across long distances. Greif (1989, 1993) documents how 11
th century Maghribi 
traders created self-enforcing contracts in difficult circumstances.  One thousand years ago these traders 
migrated out of the Middle East and scattered around the Mediterranean, organizing large-scale 
international trade between them.  Merchants located in one port would employ agents in other ports 
(agents could also be merchants) to buy or sell goods on their behalf.  Because of the difficulty of proving 
whether a contract had been followed and the problems of multiple legal jurisdictions, government 
enforcement of contracts among the Maghribi traders was not an option.  To solve this problem, the 
Maghribi traders formed a coalition that shared information about whether they felt their agent had 
represented their interests. The entire coalition could then boycott those agents who were considered 
untrustworthy, which Greif calls a multilateral reputation mechanism. By helping solve the principal 
agent problem, the network created value, and merchants and their agents benefited. The mechanism 
worked because agents could be hired at a wage premium, which meant that they had something to lose if 
they were kicked out of the network. But the wage premium was not too large because many merchants 
also served as agents, so being kicked out of the coalition would result in a double loss. Although one 
might predict that cheating would be more likely to occur as an agent approached the end of his career, 
the network eliminated this problem by allowing fathers to pass their membership to their sons.  Although 
the merchants came from the same religious group, they were not close geographically and did not 
depend on any social sanctions.  The coalition operated successfully with purely economic incentives to 
encourage honest business dealings.      
  Landa (1981, 1994) has documented other examples of trading networks as an alternative to 
contract enforcement. Even though an original producer and an end buyer might never have the 
opportunity to build up a long lasting relationship, Landa explains that middlemen have the opportunity to 
indirectly link them “together in complex networks of exchange” (1994, p.5). The middlemen create a 
system with repeat interaction out of what would otherwise be a series of short-term dealings, thus 
enabling people to rely on the discipline of continuous dealings. Landa’s discussion of ethnically 
homogenous middlemen in China describes how trust relationships provide an alternative to contract law. 
By reducing the potential for opportunistic behavior, middlemen effectively lower transaction costs. 
When people can establish relationships and choose with whom to interact, many of the problems 
associated with one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas will be absent.  
 
Trade in non-religiously homogenous groups 
  Researchers have also documented how trade without external enforcement can take place among 
people from different backgrounds. Clay (1997) documents how merchants in Mexican-California 
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nor the American legal system enforced contracts in California. Merchants, however, successfully created 
a coalition, similar to that of the Maghribi traders, to share information about agents’ reliability.  In this 
case, however, traders were mostly of British or American origin and were not born with a common 
religion.  Most integrated into local communities by learning Spanish, marrying into local families, and 
converting to Catholicism. Any given settlement might include only one or two coalition members, so 
they were not a distinct homogenous group within communities. However, even if two traders did not 
have multiple dealings with each other, members of the group could share information about the 
reputation of others to ensure that traders acted in a trustworthy manner. Agents accused of cheating 
typically settled with the aggrieved party, and in cases in which they did not, boycotts were possible. 
General boycotts were costly because they could entail forgoing trade in an entire region, so partial 
boycotts were more common. Clay shows that this network supported a relatively large volume of trade 
before the United States annexed California. The flood of immigrants accompanying the California gold 
rush redirected most shipping directly to San Francisco, thereby eliminating the need to rely on this 
dispersed network, but it provided an important service for many years. 
 
Trade involving sophisticated contracts over time 
  Reputation mechanisms can help enforce relatively sophisticated contracts as well.  Stringham 
(2003) analyzes the world’s first stock market in 17
th century Amsterdam, which by the end of the century 
included hundreds of traders who were fairly diverse socially and religiously. The government considered 
most financial contracts as forms of gambling that could be used to manipulate markets, so it refused to 
enforce contracts for all but the simplest types of transactions. Nevertheless, traders developed relatively 
sophisticated contracts, including forward contracts, short sales, and options, even though they were not 
enforceable in courts of law. Trade was possible because traders were able to share information about 
each other and boycott those who were unreliable. People who wanted to conduct considerable trade 
needed to build up a reputation for being reliable, and those who defaulted would lose trading privileges. 
Enforcement was entirely informal, but this reputation mechanism enabled the existence of sophisticated 
contracts with large payments over time.  
As markets increase in size, personal reputation mechanisms of enforcement often become more 
difficult to use.  At the end of the 17
th century and throughout the 18
th century, England developed its own 
stock market, which expanded such that stockbrokers had a difficult time tracking who was trustworthy. 
Stringham (2002) documents how brokers solved the potential problem of fraud by congregating in 
coffeehouses and transforming them into private clubs to create and enforce rules. One of their original 
solutions was to write the names of defaulters on a blackboard in Jonathan’s Coffeehouse so that others 
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of the coffeehouse to make Jonathan’s a private club. After a few iterations, the brokers successfully 
created a self-policing club referred to as New Jonathan’s; this became formally known as the London 
Stock Exchange. Only the more reliable brokers were invited to join, and those defaulting on contracts 
were kicked out, so the club created an atmosphere of trust. Individuals may have had difficulty 
investigating the reliability of all of their trading partners, but the club’s ability to enforce rules for 
members and exclude nonmembers enabled brokers to mitigate the problem of fraud.  
 
Trade among heterogeneous groups 
  In addition to documenting how traders can self-select into homogenous groups, economists have 
shown how trade can take place among heterogeneous groups as well. Leeson (2008b) explains how 
socially distant groups can come into contact and establish trading relationships when external 
enforcement is lacking. Rather than relying on ex-post reputation, groups can signal their trustworthiness 
ex-ante to establish trade. While some aspects of heterogeneity, like one’s ethnic group, are inalterable, 
other margins, such as language or religion, are malleable.  Leeson uses a formal model to show how 
trustworthiness can be established by investing in costly adaptations of margins of heterogeneity.  If a 
potential trader invests more in altering one margin of their heterogeneity in order to fit in with the group 
they would like to trade with than they could reap in rewards from cheating on a contract they can signal 
their long-term trustworthiness because they obviously must expect that the group they are trading with 
will want to continue to trade with them in order to justify their upfront investment.  Leeson draws on 
evidence from stateless regions of heterogeneous tribes in pre-colonial Africa for empirical support. He 
finds that they established trade relations with heterogeneous groups principally by altering margins of 
their culture to show support for other groups’ informal leaders, land customs, or religions. Often this 
took the form of gift giving and taking time to participate in local customs.  Leeson (2006) also finds 
evidence of traders working to signal homogeneity at the margin in medieval Europe, tribal societies, and 
modern international trade. Signaling mechanisms in these cases act as a substitute for external 
enforcement. 
 
Trade between strong and weak when property rights are insecure 
In addition, economists have documented examples of trading relationships when property rights 
are insecure. Leeson (2007f) shows that even when one party is stronger and no underlying governmental 
guarantees against violence exist, self-enforcing exchange is still possible.  In particular, he studies trade 
between European caravans and local producers in the West African interior in the late 19
th century.  The 
mobile European caravans were more powerful than the largely immobile native producers of ivory, 
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they could raid rather than trade. This created a potential problem. If the natives knew their goods would 
be stolen, they would have no incentive to produce in the first place. Market participants recognized this 
problem and solved it by separating payment from exchange through the use of credit. Leeson explains 
that natives would not hold stocks of goods that the Europeans could plunder.  Instead, natives required 
European traders to pay for the goods in advance, and only then did natives produce.  When the 
Europeans returned, only the goods they had paid for were available, so there was nothing to steal. Even 
though no laws were effective against violent theft, the use of credit allowed weaker and stronger parties 
to engage in trade. 
 
International trade without government enforcement 
  Another question economists research is to what extent self-enforcing contracts can scale upward. 
It is one thing for parties to trade in small groups, but can self-enforcing agreements take place at a global 
level? Leeson (2008a) investigates the extent to which international trade depends on government 
enforcement by looking at current international arbitration.  International trade accounts for 
approximately 25 percent of global economic activity, yet international arbitration associations rather than 
governments provide resolution of most contract disputes. Until the New York Convention of 1958, state 
enforcement of arbitration decisions was completely unavailable. States signing on to the “Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,” agreed that when a company in their 
country lost an arbitration ruling, the government would enforce the ruling if necessary. Studying 157 
countries, Leeson employs a gravity model augmented with controls for culture, history, whether the 
countries are members of a trade agreement, and whether one or both countries are signatories to the New 
York Convention.  Leeson finds that signatory states conduct more international trade, but only by 15 to 
38 percent, and non-signatory states do conduct a significant amount of international trade, indicating that 
informal voluntary mechanisms are a viable alternative to government enforcement for the majority of 
global trade. 
 
4.b Creation of law and property rights without government 
  Recent research has shown that trade can take place without external enforcement. Informal 
mechanisms such as reputation sharing can take the place of formal contract law. But the existence of 
trade independent of government does not prove that wide scale cooperative interaction can take place 
without government. In some cases, more formal enforcement may be desirable, and in all cases trade 
depends on the existence of some property rights. But although most people assume that property rights 
and formal laws must come from the state, researchers over the past few decades have been documenting 
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can benefit by eliminating the problems of opportunistic behavior.  
 
The Law Merchant 
One of the most well-documented private legal bodies is the lex mercatoria or law merchant. 
Following the work of legal historians, including Berman (1983), Fuller (1964), and Liggio (1999), 
economists such as Benson (1989) provide an economic explanation for the rise of the law merchant in 
the middle ages. Medieval merchants traveled in and out of towns, and they had little time to wait to have 
their case tried in government courts if a dispute arose. Local laws often differed, and local functionaries 
offered foreign merchants little assurance that local courts would treat them fairly. But merchants desired 
mechanisms to resolve disputes, so they developed what became known as pie powder or dusty feet 
courts. These courts adjudicated disputes based on customary business practices and were known for 
being swift, since traveling fairs were often only in a town briefly. Merchants brought their disputes to 
these private courts, and if a merchant refused to listen to the court, the remaining merchants would 
blacklist him. These courts were voluntarily chosen, so they had to be impartial, conform to business 
expectations, and evolve their “laws” as business practice evolved.  Unlike judges in government courts, 
adjudicators were selected because they were experts in a particular area of commerce. Benson finds that 
the law merchants played an important role in facilitating the use of credit, which helped lead to the 
commercial revolution.   
Similarly, Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) find that the medieval law merchant played an 
important role in the revival of international trade. As it became clear that certain ways of resolving 
disputes were better than others, the law merchant ended up creating commercial codes. These were not 
necessarily binding on future parties, but they evolved and were adopted to the extent that they helped 
resolve disputes in a sensible manner. The most effective rules then spread throughout Europe, resulting 
in a relatively uniform system of commercial law. Milgrom, North, and Weingast maintain that the 
creation of commercial codes to prevent cheating helped minimize transaction costs.
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Customary law and property rights in American history 
Spontaneously evolved commercial law was effective because arbitrators’ decisions were backed 
by the threat of commercial sanctions in the form of boycotts and ostracism.  Other evidence indicates 
that reciprocity and the threat of ostracism are important in the creation of other forms of law as well. In 
                                                 
6 Zywicki (2003) discusses how many of the sensible features of modern common law were imported from various 
legal bodies such as the law merchant. For example, Zywicki explains that the law merchant was just one of many 
competing legal systems during the Middle Ages. A modern equivalent is the growing popularity of mediation and 
arbitration as an alternative to government courts (Caplan and Stringham, 2008).  
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to recognition of the mutual benefits of participating in law enforcement. For example, colonial Puritans 
and Quakers based their laws on their religious convictions.  The church could neither seize property nor 
arrest wrongdoers, but religious tribunals could effectively enforce laws through the threat of social 
ostracism or expulsion from the community.  Similarly, law outside of federal, state, or local government 
was created and enforced in ethnic immigrant communities. Chinese in Chinatowns, Scandinavians in 
Minnesota and North Dakota, and Eastern European Jewish immigrants in Northeastern cities all 
maintained private legal codes that were distinct from American law. Although enforced solely through 
social sanctions and reciprocal relationships, these private legal codes promoted social interaction and 
order.   
Another example of law without government in U.S. history comes from the American West. 
Anderson and Hill (1979, 2004) discuss how the 19
th century frontier was beyond the reach of any federal 
or state law. Rather than being the Wild West as portrayed in the movies, however, they find it was, “An 
American Experiment with Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild Wild West.” The authors document 
numerous private mechanisms for enforcing rules, establishing property rights, and creating order.  Land 
clubs enabled people to establish property rights for land even though the federal government had yet to 
survey the territory; cattlemen’s associations helped enforce property rights on the open range, which had 
millions of cattle and lacked government police; mining camps established methods of settling mining 
claims without the use of lawyers; and wagon trains dealt with enforcement issues once people traveling 
west left the jurisdiction of the federal government.  
Building on this research, Morris (1998) documents many of these mechanisms and additional 
ones used by cattlemen, miners, and others on the frontier. Often the focal point of property rights was the 
customs of the American society from which individuals came. During the Gold Rush, however, groups 
arrived from many parts of the world, yet they successfully established property rights without the state. 
Sometimes these groups enforced their decisions with force, but often non-violent methods such as social 
exclusion and boycott were used.  Anderson and Hill (1979, p.27) conclude, “It appears in the absence of 
formal government, that the western frontier was not as wild as legend would have us believe.  The 
market did provide protection and arbitration agencies that functioned very effectively, either as a 
complete replacement for formal government or as a supplement to that government.”   
Reciprocity continues to be a source of enforcement for customary “law” in the United States 
today.  Ellickson (1991) documents how ranchers resolve disputes in cattle country in Shasta County, 
California.  He finds that formal legal rules rarely influence the outcome of cattle trespass disputes there. 
In fact, most ranchers as well as local legal experts are unaware of which formal laws apply.  Ellickson 
studied the official laws to determine how cattle trespass disputes “should” be settled, and then he went to 
  17Shasta County to ask people what they actually did. Ellickson finds that instead of relying on legalistic 
methods of dealing with disputes, the ranchers and farmers rely on notions of what they consider right. 
Because their norms often differ significantly from the law, their system of property rights and means of 
settling disputes is clearly not a product of government. Instead, customary norms of trespass are used, 
and most disputes are resolved on the basis of “good neighborliness.”  Most cattle trespasses are not made 
into a big issue and a mental accounting of sorts is kept of inter-neighbor debts.  People’s reputation in 
the community is extremely important, so most cooperate to settle any issue that arises.  
  Ellickson (1989) also researched the 19
th century whaling industry and found that whalers solved 
dilemmas privately rather than relying on government. Ellickson discusses how whalers developed 
different norms depending on the situation. Take the example of the dilemma of who has proper 
ownership of a whale after hunting. If a whale slipped free in pursuit and is found dead later, should the 
party that first pursued it or the party that ended up with it receive the carcass? A policy of those who end 
up with the whale owning 100 percent of it might encourage free riding by those who let others do 90% of 
the work and then come in at the last minute and capture the almost dead whale out of the hands of the 
other exhausted crew. But if the party that ends up with the whale is never entitled to any of the value of 
whales that escaped and then resurfaced injured or dead, then a lot of unclaimed whales would rot.  
The optimal answer is not obvious; this type of dilemma could be debated for years in 
government courts. Whalers instead developed their own rules that varied depending on the type of whale 
most prevalent in the area. In areas with slower right whales (so named because they were the right and 
easy whale to catch), whalers adopted a rule that whoever had the whale fastened on a line would own it;  
if a whale was not on the line, it was completely up for grabs. In areas containing more vigorous sperm 
whales (those like Moby Dick), whalers enforced the iron holds the whale rule, in which the first person 
who affixed a harpoon to the whale was entitled to it, even if it temporarily got free, as long as the first 
whaler remained in pursuit. And finally, in areas with finback whales, whalers used a split ownership rule. 
Finback whales usually sank to the bottom after being killed but would later resurface, often washing up 
on shore a few days later. Splitting the value of the carcass between the harpooner and the discoverer of 
the resurfaced dead whale encouraged people to work on both ends of the process. Ellickson concludes 
that members of the whaling industry were able to choose rules to maximize the benefits to the group. 
 
Property rights in cyberspace 
Cyberspace is another arena in which private mechanisms enforce property rights and contracts as 
well as establish law. In 2005 the Journal of Law, Economics & Policy published a symposium on the 
topic organized by Peter Boettke.  In it Benson (2005) documents many of the non-governmental 
mechanisms to secure property rights in cyberspace.  He argues that the online world has evolved to 
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watching, walling, and wariness.  He also finds that polycentric cybergovernance through third party 
dispute resolution is pervasive in the online world.  Cybercommunities do not correspond to political 
boundaries in geographic space, so different cybercommunities have different rules.  Since exit is an 
option from these communities, market selection mechanisms have determined how rules have evolved, 
resulting in laws that better solve particular communities’ problems than a state’s monopoly law could.   
In another contribution to the symposium, Friedman (2005) argues that reputational mechanisms 
from the real world work even better in the online world because information is cheaper to transmit and 
acquire. Digital signatures enable parties to utilize reputation mechanisms even when parties do not know 
their trading partners’ real world identity. Stringham (2005b) investigates the government’s ability to 
protect against online fraud by studying firms in Silicon Valley.  He finds that that technology moves too 
quickly for the government to keep up and that jurisdictional problems prevent governments from 
protecting sellers from online fraud. Rather than relying on ex post enforcement by government, private 
payment systems figure out ways to prevent fraud ex ante. Morriss and Korosec (2005) describe how 
credit card networks have developed advanced legal systems to prevent and resolve potential disputes 
between merchants, merchant acquirers, consumers, card issuers, card associations, and transaction 
processors. All parties involved benefit by dealing with disputes in a cost effective manner. Coyne and 
Leeson (2005) argue that private parties are better able to deal with their marginal security needs rather 
than government. In addition, Powell (2005a) examines the critical cyberinfrastructure of the financial 
services industry.  Although aspects of cybersecurity have characteristics associated with public goods, he 
finds that the private sector successfully utilizes an array of technologies to secure their infrastructure.  
Overall, these studies illustrate that many of the same private mechanisms that have evolved to provide 
order in real world situations are succeeding in cyberspace as well.   
 
Property rights in informal and illegal sectors 
  Work by de Soto (1989) has documented how systems of property rights have developed 
independent of government around the world. In Peru, for example, the government bureaucracy does not 
recognize the property rights of entire groups of people. Nevertheless, the informal sector is not lawless, 
and a thriving extralegal economy exists. From farmers in rural areas to squatters in urban areas, an 
elaborate system of property rights has developed. Even though government does not formally recognize 
these people’s property, de Soto says that one can tell where property rights begin and end by listening to 
when an owner’s dog barks. De Soto’s later work (2000) argues that government needs to formalize these 
informal titles, but his research shows that property rights precede government. 
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the state.  Sobel and Osoba (forthcoming) study one such instance.  They find that since youths in the 
U.S. often do not face substantial repercussions for committing crimes against other people and their 
property, the state doesn’t effectively protect those most at risk of youth crime – other youths.  Although 
high crime rates and youth gang formation are correlated, Sobel and Osoba hypothesize that rather than 
increasing crime, gang formation actually decreases it by providing a deterrent, in the form of retribution, 
to committing crimes against gang members. They perform causality tests and find that violent crime 
causes increases in gang membership, not vice versa.  Youth gangs are essentially private protection 
agencies that protect the rights of a subset of the population that the state is doing a particularly poor job 
of protecting.   
Rather than an unprotected or unrecognized group within a society under a government, pirates 
were a group of individuals completely outside of government who were able to create their own internal 
system of laws and property rights. Leeson (2007b) studies 18
th century pirates who were unable to use 
government to enforce their cooperative agreements due to the illegal nature of their business.  Pirate 
crews ranged in size from fewer than 100 to as many as 300 people, and multi-ship joint ventures could 
be as large as 2,000 people.  Given their size, the extended time they were at sea, and their isolated 
situation, these groups were essentially mini-societies.  While pirates employed violence against other 
ships, little internal violence and theft occurred within pirate crews despite the fact that no government 
enforced their property rights or their contracts with each other.  Leeson finds that these pirate crews were 
able to create self-enforcing contracts that allowed them to minimize internal predation and maximize 
coordination so that they could successfully plunder other vessels. In particular, they used a system of 
democratic checks through the popular election of the captain and quartermaster; a separation of powers 
among the officers; and written constitutions to establish rules governing duties and division of spoils. 
Leeson finds that pirates were efficiently employing these checks and balances before ‘legitimate’ 
governments were. And unlike formal government constitutions, since joining a pirate vessel was 
(usually) voluntary, agreement to the rules of the game was truly ex ante. Competition between pirate 
vessels meant that they had to offer profit maximizing, self-enforcing constitutions.  Few people would 
hold piracy to be a normative ideal, but even among pirates one can see degrees of cooperation without 
government. 
 
4.c. Societies without government 
  Numerous case studies illustrate how market mechanisms provide a lot of order independent of 
government, yet one might wonder how much order could exist without any government at all. Wide 
scale cases of stateless societies are not common, but examples can be found in medieval Iceland, 
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evidence of the market’s ability to provide ‘meta’ institutions that enable widespread cooperation without 
government. 
Friedman’s (1979) study of medieval Iceland, based on the sagas, is probably the most cited case 
of ordered anarchy. After its initial settlement in the 9
th century, Iceland had no government for hundreds 
of years. Nevertheless, Iceland had laws. Individuals had ties to the legal system through chieftains, but 
these chieftains were not geographic monopolies like modern governments.  Individuals could switch 
chieftains without the need to relocate, so competition occurred among providers of law.  The chieftains 
established courts and judged cases, but after they rendered judgments no institutionalized system 
enforced the decisions. Instead, plaintiffs received a transferable property right in restitution and could 
choose either to enforce their claim themselves or to sell their right of restitution to another party who 
might be in a better position to enforce the ruling.  Defendants who did not comply with rulings were 
considered ‘outlaws’ and no longer protected under the law.   
How well did the system work?  Friedman points out that the institutions survived more than 300 
years and maintains that “the society in which they survived appears to have been in many was an 
attractive one.  Its citizens were, by medieval standards, free; differences in status based on rank or sex 
were relatively small; and its literary output in relation to its size has been compared, with some justice, to 
that of Athens” (p.400).  He also finds that the system deterred violence relatively well. Rape and torture 
were uncommon, and the killing of women was nearly unheard of.  Friedman calculates that Iceland’s 
average number of people killed or executed during the most violent years of the sagas was approximately 
equal to murder and non-negligent manslaughter rates in the modern United States (p.410).  Subsequent 
economists who have studied the Icelandic legal system have reached a similar conclusion, namely that 
social order is possible without government (Solvason, 1992). 
Medieval Ireland also had law without government.  Peden (1977) documents how Ireland 
developed legal institutions, private property rights, and professional jurists, but no state. Like Iceland, 
the legal system was based on restitution rather than punishment, and people could pledge property or 
their own personal labor as a bond. The surety bonds arranged in advance of trials provided incentives for 
parties to abide by the rulings, so the private jurists, called brehons, did not need to rely on coercion to 
enforce their rulings. Women had legal capacity and the ability to own property, leading Peden (1977, 
p.91) to conclude, “By this standard Irish law in the 8
th century may have had more sophistication than 
English law in the days of Queen Victoria.” The decentralized system of law ended only when the English 
conquered Ireland and imposed a centralized legal system that undermined traditional Irish mechanisms 
of law. Here too, history shows that law and order precede government. 
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This perspective assumes that the unit of analysis is a nation, but from an anarchist point of view, the 
appropriate unit of analysis may be much smaller. Although the modern world is carved into countries 
with clear boundaries, in much of the world the units of social order are not at a national but at a tribal 
level. Benson (1988, 1990) has brought some of these societies to economists’ attention. In his study of 
“Legal Evolution in Primitive Societies,” Benson documents how many societies use voluntary customary 
law rather than government imposed law. If a legal rule is beneficial, people will have an incentive to 
adopt it, and the state need not impose it. He describes the legal system of the Kapauku Papuans of West 
New Guinea in the 20
th century, who had no formal government yet had a private legal system that 
evolved to meet ongoing needs. The Kapauku created reciprocal legal arrangements based on kinship and 
the reputation of tonowi (wealthy men) whom they trusted to assist in legal matters.  The legal system 
was mostly based on restitution or public reprimand rather than punishment, and the system largely 
respected individual property rights. Likely, countless examples of tribal systems have yet to be studied, 
so this is an area that is ripe for research.  
  A modern example of a stateless society on a national scale is Somalia. After the central 
government collapsed in 1991, the country plunged into a civil war as factions tried to establish 
themselves as the new central government. Since 1995, however, fighting has decreased; it only flares up 
when external attempts to impose a government in Somalia occur.  Despite nominal claims of having a 
“government” in two regions of northern Somalia, the creation, adjudication and enforcement of law is 
provided privately throughout Somalia.  Somali law is based on custom, and decentralized clan networks 
interpret and enforce it.  As in Iceland and Ireland, the legal system focuses on the restitution of victims, 
not the punishment of criminals; each Somali is born into an insurance paying group that is responsible 
for compensating a victim in the event that a defendant from the group is unwilling or able to pay.  
Neither the clans nor the insurance groups are geographic monopolies; individuals are free to switch to 
new ones.  Three recent papers study how well anarchic Somalia has performed.  Coyne (2006) 
examines measures of income, health, children’s health, telecommunications, and infrastructure.  He finds 
that Somalia compares relatively well on measures of poverty and infrastructure provision compared to 
neighboring countries and West African countries.  Leeson (2007c) compares how 18 development 
indicators have changed since the collapse of Somalia’s nation state.  He compares the last five years 
Somalia had a state (85-90) to the most recent five years with available data (2000-2005).  Of the 18 
development indicators, 13 clearly improved since the collapse of the state, and only two, adult literacy 
and school enrollment, clearly declined.  In addition, Powell et al. (forthcoming) compare Somalia’s 
living standards to those of the 42 other sub-Saharan countries with data available both pre- and post-
Somali state collapse.  Of the 13 measures they identify, Somalia ranks in the top 50 percent of nations in 
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improved water sources.  The authors find that, compared to pre-state collapse measures, Somalia has 
improved not just in absolute terms but also relative to the performance of other African countries. These 
results hold up when Somalia is compared only to peaceful African nations and only to other countries 
that, like Somalia, warred in the early 1990s and then established peace.   
 
4.d. Lessons from case studies of law without government 
  The cases of Iceland, Ireland, and Somalia provide some evidence that privately created law, 
adjudication, and enforcement is possible on a society-wide basis.  Unfortunately, we are lacking a 
modern, wealthy stateless society, so current historical scholarship is silent on whether these systems can 
function at a higher level of development.  What the cases of Iceland, and to a greater extent Somalia, do 
illustrate is that in a comparative institutional setting, given history, culture, level of development, etc., 
these stateless societies have done quite well while using completely private legal systems.  
  The enforcement of contracts, creation of property rights, resolution of disputes, and enforcement 
of law are all areas in which many economists believe that markets fail and government provision is 
necessary.  In this section we have discussed a wealth of scholarship that demonstrates that markets may 
be more robust at providing these services than economists have presumed.  Nevertheless, the question 
remains of how much these mechanisms can scale up, either from the roles they currently play in modern 
society or from their role in less developed societies, to fully support a modern society.   
 
5.  Modern theoretical and experimental debates about anarchy 
 
In addition to the increasing number of historical studies of ordered anarchy, the past fifteen years have 
also seen an increase in theoretical and experimental debates about anarchy.  Historical studies show that 
order is possible without government, but important questions remain: Is ordered anarchy stable in the 
long run? How much could the institutions of self-governance scale up? Could they support a modern 
society? Theoretical and experimental discussions are needed to answer these questions.  
The theoretical and experimental literature on anarchy can be categorized into four areas.  The 
first group can be seen as an extension of the 1970s public choice explorations of what an institutionless 
anarchist equilibrium might look like.  A second group can be seen as an extension of the work of 
Friedman, Rothbard, and Nozick and their discussion of how anarchy with private law enforcement might 
function. A third group of public choice scholars have theorized about the relative desirability of anarchy 
versus the state.  A fourth group uses modern simulation studies and experimental economics to 
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reviews each of these areas in turn.   
 
5.a. Theoretical debates about anarchy without institutions of law 
  Early public choice articles modeled anarchy as a prisoners’ dilemma.  Modern articles have built 
off of variations on that theme to reach slightly different conclusions. Kurrild-Klitgaard (2002) is one 
example. He starts by modeling Hobbesian and Lockean state-of-the-nature-games, emphasizing Locke’s 
point that not every form of political authority is always preferable to any type of state-of-nature. Then 
exit is built into the prisoners’ dilemma game.  Once players can exit, the standard prisoners’ dilemma 
outcome can turn into a viable long-term cooperation strategy.  Kurrild-Klitgaard argues that a prudent 
morality strategy (i.e., a player refuses to play with those who defected in the past) beats other strategies 
(e.g., tit for tat, or opportunist), and repeated games lead toward the building of trust and reputation. Even 
if asymmetric pay-offs are introduced, cooperative outcomes can occur.  The standard prisoners’ dilemma 
argument against anarchy is much weaker when the exit option is taken into account.  
Hirshleifer (1995, 2001) studies anarchy as a potentially a peaceful Hayekian spontaneous order, 
but considers the conditions under which anarchy would devolve into chaos or lead to a state.  Hirshleifer 
(1995) models groups as unitary actors, with efforts divided into either production from assets or fighting 
to seize assets.  His model includes technologies of both production and appropriation and suggests that a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for stable anarchy is strongly diminishing returns to fighting. 
Variations of Hirshleifer’s model examine: two contenders, asymmetrical fighting effort and resources, 
costs, strategic positions, exogenous/endogenous number of contenders, Cournot and Stackelberg 
competition.  The overall conclusion is that although an anarchic system is sometimes stable, anarchy is 
extremely fragile and likely to break down. Hirshleifer believes that anarchy will either result in a world 
where all resources are wasted or in a world with a state. To Hirshliefer, stable, ordered anarchy is highly 
unlikely.
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  Dowd (1997) argues that Hirshleifer ignores as a third possibility in which anarchy ends up 
peaceful rather than becoming violent or devolving into a state. He says that social rules can develop such 
that disputes need not be solved exclusively by violence. Drawing on historical studies. Dowd argues that 
private judges can help develop a system of customary law. By avoiding violence, parties have the ability 
                                                 
7  Other recent articles that model anarchy include Warneryd (2000), Bos and Kolmar (2003), and Anderson and 
Macouiller (2005). The various authors discuss the conditions under which cooperation rather than a Hobbesian 
jungle are likely to arise. Grossman (2002) and others discuss why even a predatory state could be preferable to 
anarchy.  They argue that as the as the technology of predation becomes more effective, the desirability of even an 
exploitative state increases. For a critique of the idea that people voluntarily choose government, see Block and 
DiLorenzo (2000).  
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Hobbesian anarchy.  
Hausken (2006) builds on Hirshleifer’s model, but instead of modeling groups as unified actors, 
Hausken attempts to incorporate the conflict inherent within competing groups. He assumes that actors 
either specialize in production or fighting and that fighting will determine the distribution of productive 
resources. Furthermore, some members of a group may wish to contribute to their group’s fighting effort, 
but others may attempt to free ride. The model predicts that anarchy will include some production and 
some fighting rather than having corner solutions with all of either one. Hosken states that unless the cost 
of fighting is extremely high or the groups are small with similar productivities, all productivity and no 
fighting will not occur.  He also says all fighting and no production is impossible because of free riding 
within groups. Society thus benefits because of the existence of free riding. When collective action 
problems are important, a semi-peaceful anarchy becomes possible. 
Economists are now looking to study anarchy for both positive and normative reasons. From a 
positive perspective, Rajan (2004, p.56) argues that it does not make sense for economists to assume that 
“all contracts are enforced by omniscient, incorruptible courts; and governments automatically take care 
of all the public goods and interfere in none of the private ones.” In many cases, especially in less 
developed countries, governments are quite unlike this. All economic models that assume a perfect 
government have unrealistic assumptions that lead to a misunderstanding of how the world works. From a 
normative perspective, Rajan argues that making such assumptions is also a bad recipe for public policy 
since governments implementing policies are so far from perfect. Rajan instead argues that we should 
assume anarchy and proceed from there. 
Dixit’s (2004) book, Lawlessness and Economics, examines how property rights can be respected 
and trade can take place when the rule of law is absent. Most economists implicitly assume that the law 
operates costlessly, but Dixit argues that in the real world this is never true. Government courts are often 
“very costly, slow, unreliable, biased, corrupt, weak, or simply absent” (Dixit, 2004, p.3). Nevertheless, 
economic activity still takes place, and thus economists should be studying how trade can take place in 
absence of law. Dixit discusses historical examples of lawless situations and then models them using 
game theory. Long term dealings, reputation mechanisms, and arbitration are three important ways that 
parties can bring about private order. Dixit appears to be unaware of most of the literature on anarchism;
8 
nevertheless, his book is a major contribution to this line of research. 
 
                                                 
8 For example, Dixit (2004, p.2) writes, “Even the most libertarian economists, who deny the government any useful 
role in most aspects of the economy, allow that making and enforcing laws that give clear definitions of property 
rights, and ensuring adherence to voluntary private contracts, are legitimate and indeed essential functions of 
government.” 
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5.b. Theoretical debates about anarchy with privately generated law 
  Many authors have outlined visions of how an ordered anarchy might look. In the 1970s 
Friedman and Rothbard theorized that multiple protection agencies would peacefully be able to settle 
disputes within a given geographic area.  Nozick, in contrast, argued that even if society started in a 
competitive market with multiple firms, a minimal state will naturally arise. Since then, especially in the 
past fifteen years, public choice scholars have contributed to the debate about the stability of a private 
competitive protection market.   
Cowen (1992) argues that a system with competing companies will devolve into a coercive 
government because law enforcement is a network industry in which firms must interact. Cowen’s article, 
“Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy,” includes “Public Good” in the title, not because the 
government is providing a good but because Cowen believes that a legal system must apply to everyone 
in a geographic area. He argues that if firms are able to cooperate, rather than fight, to settle disputes, then 
that same mechanism will enable them to cooperate to collude. Even if multiple firms exist, Cowen 
argues that the result will be a de facto monopoly that can use force to exact taxes, just like government.  
Either competing firms will be unable to cooperate and thus an ordered anarchy of competitive firms will 
dissolve into a Hobbesian war, or the ability to cooperate will enable them to collude and act like a 
government.   
Friedman (1994) responds to Cowen by agreeing that firms would have relationships with each 
other, but he disagrees that private protection must be a network industry that facilitates a cartel. He 
argues that a situation with bilateral contracts between firms is quite different than a situation with one 
industry-wide contract. If the only relationships in the industry are between pairs of firms, these 
relationships do nothing to enhance their ability to collude. Friedman argues that this situation is akin to 
the contractual relationships between grocery stores and suppliers.  
Cowen’s (1994) rejoinder argues that analogies from regular industries do not apply because the 
protection industry uses force. Competing firms must cooperate to enforce laws, and any ability to 
cooperate will enable them to coercively form a cartel. Whereas most cartels break down on their own, 
Cowen believes that a cartel with members whose business is force will be able exact compliance from 
everyone. The number of firms is unimportant because even though the world has many different police 
forces and local governments, they still collude.  
Caplan and Stringham (2004) question Cowen’s argument that network industries facilitate 
collusion. Although enforcement of law across multiple agencies would require some cooperation, the 
ability to cooperate does not guarantee the ability to collude. The authors distinguish between self-
enforcing and non-self-enforcing agreements and argue that collusive agreements between firms would be 
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break the agreement. On the other hand, if firms coordinate to boycott a bad business risk, each firm has 
an incentive to follow the agreement lest it be cheated itself. Caplan and Stringham give historical 
examples of network industries that have been able to facilitate coordination without collusion. In 19
th 
century America, banks joined clearinghouses that monitored banks to assure solvency, but despite their 
efforts clearinghouses did not enable banks to fix interest rates. In modern times credit card issuers 
cooperate when it comes to coordinating payments, but they still have to compete when it comes to 
service.  
Cowen and Sutter (2005) reply, arguing that Caplan and Stringham’s analysis underestimates the 
importance of the use of force. Cowen and Sutter claim that the interaction between firms is a 
coordination game with multiple equilibria. Although a situation of armed conflict may not occur, firms 
might back down to the demands of a coercive firm rather than defending their clients’ rights. Because 
membership in a network is valuable, the incumbents may be able to exercise their market power at the 
expense of others. Such a situation will enable members of a network to enact coercive rules and then 
refuse to deal with new entrants who do not agree. This sows the seeds for the creation of government, 
whether customers and other firms like it or not.  
  Sutter (1995) also considered the power relations between protective firms and their customers.  
He models a game in which firms have more power than customers and may use that power to prevent 
customers from switching to other firms. Without the ability to exit, the competitive checks from multiple 
firms are undermined. Sutter considers how various exit strategies and cost structures could impact the 
competitive nature of the industry. Under certain circumstances the distribution of rights between 
customers and firms will be more equal than the distribution of their power. Depending on the 
assumptions used, a competitive system may or may not be viable.  
Stringham (2006) argues that one potential way for markets to deal with the problems of 
predation by private law enforcement is through vertical integration. If the owner of a proprietary 
community provides law enforcement, then any malfeasance on the part of the law enforcer (the 
proprietor) will result in decreased rent in the community. Stringham argues that making the law enforcer 
a profit motivated residual claimant will align the incentives of the proprietor/law enforcer with its 
customers. This vision of private law enforcement is in contrast with the view that multiple governing 
authorities in a given area is the goal (Frey, 2001). Stringham maintains that anarchists should be less 
concerned with the number of firms in an industry and more concerned with whether individuals agree to 
a system ex ante. Stringham says that one can agree with many of the arguments of the classical liberals 
about the need for a monopoly in a given area, yet one need not conclude that law enforcement must be 
provided by the state.  
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a proprietary community, its law enforcement, and its customers is ex ante utility enhancing to all parties 
involved, cooperation may not be the final outcome. Leeson formalizes Stringham’s proposal and argues 
that the private law enforcer will have an incentive to cheat ex post. Leeson says that the system depends 
on trust and the discipline of continuous dealings, but he maintains that such mechanisms will not 
function when parties can resort to force. Since a proprietary community with private law enforcement 
will be much stronger than its customers, he argues that the law enforcement will maximize profits by 
extorting from clients and that another solution must be found. 
Finally, Holcombe (2004) also claims that the ultimate outcome rests on force. He argues that 
although government is not voluntary, created to benefit the public, or even necessary, it will always 
prevail. Anarcho-capitalism would either internally devolve into government or be overtaken by an 
external state. Holcombe maintains that the best we can hope for is to proactively create a limited 
government. Leeson and Stringham (2005) respond, arguing that Holcombe is too pessimistic about the 
possibility of stateless orders and too optimistic about limited government. If Holcombe’s Hobbesian 
assumptions are correct, then nothing stops limited government from becoming unlimited government. 
Leeson and Stringham maintain that limiting government ultimately depends on ideological opposition to 
the state, and that if limited government is possible, so too is anarchy. 
 
5.c. Comparative analysis of anarchy versus the state 
  Public choice economists’ early explorations in the theory of anarchy often compared the 
desirability of a theoretical state of anarchy to the desirability of a theoretical government. Generally, they 
argued that a world with government is far superior to a world without government, so they hypothesized 
that individuals under anarchy would unanimously agree to form a state.  Recent comparative analysis by 
public choice scholars, however, has been more critical of the universal desirability of a state. In addition, 
many public choice scholars have abandoned social contract modeling and instead model state formation 
as a result of self-interested actions imposed on unwilling populations. 
Mueller (1988) offers a framework for judging between anarchy and the state, and makes a 
conditional case for government. In more primitive societies, however, he argues that anarchy can be 
orderly when the population is small and has low mobility. Repeated interaction, social pressure, and 
norms allow people to eliminate prisoners’ dilemmas. He writes (1988, p.821), “Small numbers and 
immobility favor the anarchic achievement of Pareto optimality for public goods provision.” On the other 
hand, Mueller argues that markets for private goods work best with large numbers of buyers and sellers, 
the conditions under which solving the public goods problem will be difficult. Mueller suggests that a 
modern society with large cities would be impossible without a state, because too many prisoners’ 
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Hobbesian problems. The costs of devising private solutions, such as those based on reputation, must be 
weighed against the costs of having government and its regulation. He concludes that a modern world 
with total anarchy would be suboptimal, but his framework does not exclude the possibility. 
Leeson (2007d) makes a conditional case for anarchy, examining the conditions under which 
anarchy could be preferable to even a benevolent government.  He assumes that state enforcement of 
property and contracts enhances the gains from trade that society is able to achieve. However, he also 
recognizes that costs will arise, such as the decision making costs of arriving at a set of rules the state is to 
enforce, and the external cost of collective decision making that occurs when the group decides something 
contrary to one’s personal interest. Leeson argues that whether anarchy is efficient depends on the 
magnitude of the increase in gains from trade compared to the costs of government. When there is little to 
gain from trade or when the costs of government are very high, anarchy may be preferable to government. 
Leeson maintains that anarchy is often efficient in primitive societies with small trading populations, 
relative homogeneity of productive capabilities and preferences, and some informal institutions to 
facilitate trade. In these cases, the gains from trade that a government could create would be minimal. 
Furthermore, international anarchy already exists on a global level. Leeson argues that the international 
arena is a case in which the cost of government is large; even though gains from trade would be big, a 
world government is not desirable. Societies vary between these extremes, and whether any given state is 
efficient compared to anarchy depends on the balancing of these relative costs and benefits.   
The relative merits of anarchy versus government can be modeled with game theory as well. Witt 
(1992) evaluates the desirability of forming a social contract.  He follows Buchanan’s basic approach, but 
considers the possibility that a government will use its monopoly on the use of force for the benefit of the 
rulers rather than the people.  While a social contract solves the prisoners’ dilemma of interactions 
between individuals, it creates a new prisoners’ dilemma between the government and the people.  Witt 
argues that once this second level is considered, people are much less likely to find it in their interest to 
form a state. 
  If a state emerges from a process by means other than a social contract, does that make the state 
undesirable?  McGuire and Olson (1996) and Olson (2000) consider the creation of government to be 
based on predation rather than contract, but still consider the outcome positive. Their model is essentially 
Hobbesian: amoral individuals plunder whenever they can.  In a world comprised of “roving bandits,” 
individuals become less likely to produce because their resources are preyed upon in a tragedy of the 
commons situation.  McGuire and Olson argue that if one bandit (the government) can monopolize theft 
in a given jurisdiction, it will essentially privatize part of the commons for itself. They consider this a 
good thing because the state becomes a sort of residual claimant that will steal, but not steal so much as to 
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9  The state not only has a direct interest in the product of the ruled, but it has an 
incentive to provide a stable social order, including protection to help maximize production. McGuire and 
Olson (1996, pp.73-74) write, “It is as if the ruling power were guided by a hidden hand no less 
paradoxical for us than the invisible hand in the market was for the people in Adam Smith’s time…the 
invisible hand will lead it, remarkably, to treat those subject to its power as well as it treats itself.”  To 
these authors, the state increases the welfare of all parties, including those who had the state imposed on 
them.   
  Moselle and Polak (2001) also consider the relative merits of anarchy, roving bandits, and 
stationary bandits, but reach the opposite conclusion. Comparing the predatory state to anarchy, they 
argue that a predatory state may reduce both output and welfare. They model the choice set of the 
predatory state and how it wields its power. Government may create law and order, but it will yield its 
power to become more of a plunderer. Compared to roving bandits, the predatory state will have an easier 
time stealing from the populace and so may engage in even more thievery. Thus, a more powerful state is 
not something one should necessarily assume to be good. Moselle and Polak (2001, p.5) argue that to the 
extent that primitive states were unconstrained, “then it is possible that such states were bad.” 
  Powell and Coyne (2003) also consider how the interests of the rulers and the ruled fail to 
dovetail in the way Olson claims. They consider cases in which rulers are not narrow monetary 
maximizers but instead have subjective preferences regarding social outcomes.  Becoming a stationary 
bandit raises a ruler’s income substantially, and if the other goods the ruler values are normal goods, he 
will demand more of them, even if this decreases his long term monetary wealth at the margin. Thus, even 
the prototypical stationary bandit can make citizens worse off.   
In addition to the increasing number of articles, book-length volumes are exploring the relative 
merits of anarchy versus government, including Anarchy, State, and Public Choice (Stringham, 2005a).
10 
Anarchy, State, and Public Choice revisits the issues originally raised in the monographs Explorations in 
the Theory of Anarchy and Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy three decades before. The 
edited volume reprints the main chapters from the original public choice volumes and contains new 
responses by eight George Mason University trained economists. Furthermore, it contains new reflections 
by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock as well as a contribution from Jeffery Hummel. Compared to 
their predecessors, the younger generation is less inclined to view government as working for the public 
                                                 
9 See Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003) for a historical case study.  They examine the evolution of Viking 
governance from a situation in which Vikings over-plundered territories as roving bandits. Eventually the Vikings 
settled down and became stationary bandits, in the process deciding to provide order and public goods so they could 
maximize revenue for themselves.   
10 Recent books that debate this topic with less of an exclusively economic focus include Stringham (2007) and 
Long and Machan (2008). 
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upon as a solution.  
Osborne (2005) follows up on Bush (1972), contending that because of the adoption of contingent 
cooperation strategies, people will engage in less cheating than the Winston Bush model foretells. Coyne 
(2005) provides a critical evaluation of Tullock (1972) by describing how private parties (including 
private law enforcement) may solve the problems in Hobbesian anarchy. Leeson (2005) responds to 
Gunning (1972) by discussing ways in which contracts take place without external enforcement. Powell 
(2005b) addresses the concerns raised by Buchanan (1972), taking the Hobbesian assumptions of 
Buchanan’s model and questioning whether a government populated by these same Hobbesian individuals 
can bring about any improvement. Storr (2005) reexamines the case studies of anarchy in Hogarty (1972) 
and concludes they are inconclusive about the desirability of anarchy because all fail to replicate any 
reasonable approximation of a real world anarchic situation. Beaulier (2005) evaluates the concerns raised 
by Samuels (1974) and finds Samuels’ definition of power to be too broad to conclusively claim that an 
ordered anarchy with private law enforcement would be just as coercive as government.  
Buchanan (2005) provides an interesting comment on the new works, writing, “The seminar 
papers, as published in the small volumes edited by Gordon Tullock, as well as Tullock’s book, The 
Social Dilemma (1974b) and my own book, The Limits of Liberty (1975), should, at least in part, be 
interpreted as reactions to the times.” Tullock (2005) stays true to his universal message and questions 
whether ordered anarchy is really possible. Hummel (2005) responds, arguing that anarchy is possible if 
people’s ideology is strong enough to surmount the same types of public choice problems faced when 
trying to keep a government limited.
11  Boettke (2005) ends the volume, arguing that anarchism is more 
than a normative endeavor. The world has many puzzles that cannot be explained by theories that assume 
the dependence of markets on government. The review of Anarchy, State and Public Choice appearing in 
Public Choice concludes: “Overall the book demonstrates the considerable progress made in 
understanding the working of libertarian anarchy over the past thirty-plus years…The contemporary 
responses to the papers in Tullock’s edited volumes demonstrates that interest in anarchy is alive with the 
current generation of public choice economists” (Sutter, 2008, p.493). 
 
5.d. Agent based modeling and experimental investigations of anarchy 
  As the debate about anarchy has advanced, some scholars have applied various tools from 
modern economics to evaluate theories. Historical case studies are useful for examining slices of anarchy, 
but these studies are often silent on how things might happen in other circumstances. Unfortunately (or 
                                                 
11 Hummel (2001) explores the role of ideology in greater depth when examining its role in providing “national” 
defense in an anarchist society and its role in the transition process from a government to an anarchic state.   
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to observe to help corroborate or disprove the different theories of anarchy. For example, little historical 
evidence exists about how humans behave in an institutionless state of nature.  As Tullock notes, 
“Hobbes’s ‘war of all against all’ was not part of human history,” and “Insofar as we can tell man 
developed from an ape which was already social.  In other words, our predecessors lived in small bands 
whose social coherence depended to a considerable extent upon inherited behavior patterns” (1974, p.9). 
Since a lack of evidence prevents economists from observing behavior in a state of nature, some 
researchers are now investigating the realism of the formal theories using simulations and experimental 
laboratories.   
Vanderschraaf (2006) uses agent based modeling to explore how humans might interact over time 
under Hobbesian anarchy. Vanderschraaf (2006, p.243) believes “that this kind of dynamical analysis is a 
more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of 
anarchy in the literature.” The model assumes that parties do not know the pay-offs of their partners and 
no mechanisms can generate any common knowledge about the parties, but that individuals can change 
their behavior over time. The simulations show that if everyone in the population is inclined toward 
cooperation, then anarchy converges to a state of peace.  But if even a small number of “nasty” people are 
present in the initial conditions, they cause others to start acting nasty in response. In the model, people 
who do not know whether they are interacting with cooperators or dominators treat everyone as enemies. 
Hence, through experience everyone learns to not cooperate, and this sparks the Hobbesian war of all 
against all. However, Vanderschraaf suggests that future research could relax the no knowledge 
assumption, which might allow a peaceful outcome to be achieved.   
  Another avenue of research attempts to model a state of nature in a laboratory and then observe 
the behavior of the subjects. Carter and Anderton (2001) investigate pairs of subjects who alternate 
between two types of roles: first-movers who can be productive and/or engage in defense, and second-
movers who can be productive and/or engage in offense to appropriate the endowments of the first-
movers.  The second-movers observe the decisions of the first-movers before making their own. The 
authors find that the outcome is sensitive to the conditions, namely, increasing the relative effectiveness 
of predation leads the equilibrium level of appropriation to vary from zero, to partial, to full predation.  
Duffy and Kim’s (2005) study of anarchy in the laboratory complements Carter and Anderson by 
increasing the size of the societies from two to ten individuals, who can choose to be either a producer or 
a plunderer. Subjects who choose to be producers must decide how to divide their resources between 
income production and defense against plunder. Plunderers must invest all resources in plunder. Each 
plunderer shares equally in the production appropriated from the producers, and each producer shares 
equally in the production that remains after plundering. After seeing what happens under anarchy, Duffy 
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all producers to deter plunder.  Duffy and Kim find that (a) without dictators, the experimental economies 
approach the Nash equilibrium of their anarchy model, and that (b) dictators lead all of the individuals to 
become producers instead of plunderers, thereby achieving a Pareto superior outcome. 
Powell and Wilson (forthcoming) expand on these studies by creating a real time Hobbesian 
jungle to measure the deadweight cost of predation.  In their experimental societies, each of six 
individuals can choose how much, if any, of their productive endowment to invest in offense and/or 
defense. The subjects are not compartmentalized, exogenously or endogenously, as either pure producers 
or pure plunderers; they can choose the degree to which they wish to allocate productive units to offense 
and defense and can change these allocations throughout the experiment.   Moreover, the experiment is 
conducted in continuous time (i.e., defensive decisions do not necessarily precede offensive ones, and 
offensive choices do not necessarily follow defensive decisions). There are no rounds in which subjects 
repeatedly face the same decisions.  Actions can occur at any time.  Each subject also has just one shot 
with their “life.” Since productive assets earn subjects money whereas offensive and defensive units do 
not, Powell and Wilson are able to examine the inefficiency of a Hobbesian jungle without external 
enforcement. Their experimental jungles were neither utopian nor particularly brutish, and were 42.9 
percent efficient on average.  Powell and Wilson also periodically test Buchanan’s hypothesis that people 
in a state of anarchy will unanimously agree to form a social contract; they found that constitutional 
contracts were unanimously adopted only 1 out of 31 times. 
Kimbrough et al. (2008) use a laboratory to explore how property rights emerge without external 
enforcement.  Their experiment involves eight anonymous subjects who begin in pairs and are gradually 
merged into a single group as the experiment progresses.  Individuals differ in productive capabilities and 
preferences over two goods.  To achieve efficiency, subjects must discover specialization and exchange. 
In Kimbrough et al.’s initial treatment, property rights are exogenously enforced by forbidding 
individuals to steal.  In later treatments individuals are allowed to steal, which could inhibit the groups’ 
ability to achieve efficiency by specializing and exchanging.  In their experiments the researchers find 
that in the chat room entrepreneurial subjects argued to convince others that they all can earn more by 
mutually respecting property rights. Others then followed that lead. Kimbrough et al. found no 
statistically significant difference in efficiency between sessions in which property rights were perfectly 
enforced exogenously and those in which property rights arrangements were left to the subjects to evolve 
endogenously.   
These new research methods provide an important complement to the historical and theoretical 
studies of anarchy. The results of agent based models and experimental studies of anarchy are sensitive to 
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laboratory setting when no naturally occurring cases are available. Experimental studies enable 
researchers to observe how people actually react under various situations rather than just assuming that 
conflict will always or never prevail. These new methods of exploring anarchy show that the study of 
anarchy has come a long way, and they should prove fruitful for further investigations of how ordered 
anarchy might function.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Economists’ contributions to the study of anarchy in the past four decades have been substantial. While 
almost no economists studied anarchy before the 1970s, since then scores of articles have been written on 
the subject. Beyond the potentially interesting normative questions, the positive economic analysis of 
anarchy can provide many insights about how property rights and order are formed.  Rather than 
assuming that government is always perfect and property rights are always secure, scholars following in 
the footsteps of the original public choice economists can now study what actually happens when 
government enforcement is imperfect. Many aspects of the economy currently fall outside state influence, 
making reliance on law enforcement an unusable option. Even in most people’s everyday lives, 
individuals cannot rely on government at every turn, yet order persists. How is that possible? Economists 
who study anarchy now have much more to say about the many pockets of stateless orders in the world.  
Much of the recent historical research on anarchy indicates that ordered anarchy is a lot more 
common than earlier thinkers assumed. In light of this, one can no longer say that contracts are impossible 
without government. Without government enforcement, trade can take place not only in simple situations 
but also in large groups, between heterogeneous traders, and in cases involving complicated contracts 
over time. Similarly, in light of the recent research, one can no longer say that property rights and law 
itself are impossible without government. Many pockets of society past and present rely on customary 
laws, and in some cases whole societies exist without government.  
Public choice revolutionized the way economists think about government.  Once one recognizes 
that agents of the state may not promote the general interest, even idealized governments can suffer from 
“government failure.” By recognizing that public choice insights also can apply to law, members of 
society might decide that government law enforcement should not be given carte blanche. Rather than 
assuming that ordered anarchy is impossible and that government is always perfect, economists should 
now undertake comparative analysis between real world anarchy and real world government. Under what 
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These are open research questions. 
In 2004 Buchanan wrote, “As I now reflect on that burst of interest in the theory of anarchy, I 
now realize that we were perhaps too influenced by the Bush-Tullock presumption to the effect that the 
behavioral hypotheses used were necessarily empirically grounded.” The pessimistic Hobbesian beliefs 
about human behavior under anarchy might not always hold. Buchanan (2004, p.268) writes that their 
pessimistic assumptions “led us to neglect at that time any effort to work out just what an ordered anarchy 
would look like. What would be the results if persons should behave so as to internalize all of the relevant 
externalities in their dealings among themselves?”   
By asking important research questions, public choice scholars have helped open the door to an 
entire line of research. If workable and perhaps superior alternatives to government law enforcement 
exist, the previously unquestioned choice of government over anarchy can come into question. In the 
greater scheme of things, civilization is a few thousand years old, but the study of economics is only a 
few centuries old. Yet, society has advanced significantly since people began studying economics. 
Similarly, although the study of economics is a few hundred years old, the economic analysis of anarchy 
is only a few decades old. Have economists discovered a viable alternative that until now has been too 
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